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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
 No. 10-1026 
___________ 
 
CAROL KARCHNAK, 
        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SWATARA TOWNSHIP; DAVID BOGDANOVIC; 
JASON D. UMBERGER; COMMISSIONER RICCI 
_______________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 D.C. Civil Action No. 07-cv-1405 
 (Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo) 
______________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 January 14, 2011 
 Before:  BARRY, VANASKIE, and COWEN,
*
 Circuit Judges. 
 
 (Filed: August 2, 2011 ) 
 
_________________ 
 
 OPINION 
_________________ 
 
                                                 
*
 The Honorable Anthony J. Scirica recused during the pendency of this case, and the 
panel was reconstituted to include the Honorable Robert E. Cowen.   
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BARRY, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Carol Karchnak retired after many years of service as a police officer with Swatara 
Township (“Township”). She sued the Township and her superiors in the police 
department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for purported violations of her rights, while she was a 
police officer, under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all but one claim and submitted that 
claim to a jury. The jury found in favor of the defendants, and the Court then entered 
judgment in the defendants’ favor on all of Karchnak’s claims. We will affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 The Township hired Karchnak as a police officer in 1986, and she worked in the 
police department in several different capacities, including as a dog handler. In 2003, 
another dog handler sued the department for compensation issues. Karchnak was not a 
party to the suit, but she supported it and sought to speak to the Board of Police 
Commissioners about the issues involved in it. The department later terminated her dog 
handling duties.  
In 2005, the police department instituted a new performance evaluation system, of 
which Karchnak was critical. The system required officers to keep detailed logs of their 
activities during their shifts, and in 2007 she learned that another officer had falsified his 
logs. She shared that information with the Internal Affairs Officer, and the parties 
disputed before the District Court whether reporting the log falsification was part of her 
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official duties. She was disciplined shortly thereafter for her alleged failure to properly 
supervise subordinate officers. 
Karchnak claims that the defendants retaliated against her exercise of her First 
Amendment free speech rights when they (1) did not promote her, (2) cancelled her dog-
handling contract, (3) took too long to approve her request for donations of sick leave 
after she was diagnosed with breast cancer, and (4) unfairly disciplined her for failing to 
properly supervise subordinate officers. She also made vague allegations of violations of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all of 
Karchnak’s claims, except for her claim that the discipline she received in 2007 was in 
retaliation for her report of her fellow officer’s falsified logs.1 The Court concluded that 
there were several genuine issues of material fact regarding that claim, including whether 
reporting the falsified logs was part of her official duties as a police officer. See Garcetti 
v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (“[W]hen public employees make statements 
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First 
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from 
employer discipline.”).  
                                                 
1
 The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Township on all of 
Karchnak’s claims because she did not allege or produce evidence that could support a 
conclusion “that a municipal policy or custom of Swatara Township was responsible for 
the alleged violation of her First or Fourteenth Amendment rights.” (App. at 53.) 
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The parties proceeded to a jury trial on the remaining claim, and the District Court 
granted the defendants’ motions in limine to preclude the introduction of evidence 
unrelated to that claim. The jury found that reporting the falsified logs was part of 
Karchnak’s official duties, and the Court entered judgment in favor of the defendants on 
all of her claims.  
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the Court’s 
partial grant of summary judgment, and we review its rulings regarding the scope of the 
trial, and the evidence presented, for abuse of discretion. 
III. ANALYSIS 
 Karchnak contends that the District Court erred in its partial grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants and in limiting the scope of the issues and evidence 
that the parties presented to the jury. As the party opposing summary judgment, 
Karchnak “must support” her assertion “that a fact . . . is genuinely disputed” by either 
“citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or “showing that the materials cited 
do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). In her 
brief on appeal, she has failed to identify any genuine dispute of material fact, other than 
the issue that the jury decided, or meet the other requirements of Rule 56(c). We will 
therefore affirm the Court’s partial grant of summary judgment. 
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 Karchnak also has not shown that the District Court abused its discretion in 
limiting the evidence and issues that the parties presented to the jury. The Court acted 
well within its discretion, and we will affirm on this issue, as well.
2
  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
 
  
 
                                                 
2
 Karchnak previously moved to remand this case so that the District Court could, 
among other things, address her “motion for special relief,” in which she complained of 
the defendants’ alleged intimidation of witnesses who worked for the Township. We 
denied that motion and stated that her “complaints about the District Court appear more 
appropriately addressed in the context of [her] appeal rather than by summary motion.” 
(Order, May 19, 2010.) We need not further discuss this issue because she declined our 
invitation to address it in her brief. (See Appellant’s Br. at 34.) 
